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The idea of God is one from which contemporary philosophy, to say nothing of 
Western society at large, seems to have turned away from or replaced by other 
quests. There is however no greater and more vital subject than the idea of God. 
It is essential because it is difficult to see how life can have an overriding 
meaning if there is no God. Or, as Ivan Karamazov puts it in Dostoyevsky’s 
novel, if there is no God, all hell breaks loose. For philosophers and inquiring 
minds, God also happens to be one of the most cogent answers to the question as 
to why there is Being and not nothing. There is little to be gained by looking 
down on such an answer, which was revered as the highest Good in all cultures 
and epochs. 
 
Can God be Understood? 
 
It goes without saying that, like all good answers, the answer of God raises itself 
a host of thorny questions. Two are most prominent and endlessly debated 
(besides the recurrent theodicy problem): does God exist? what is God? In 
classical terminology, these questions relate to the existence of God and to its 
essence. Many today may deem these questions to be secondary or too 
“metaphysical,” in the bad sense of the word. It is also fashionable, at least in 
some circles, to claim that God cannot be understood, that God is beyond 
anything we “deplorable” mortals could grasp or utter about him or her. The idea 
that we know nothing of God is a main tenet of the otherwise respectable 
tradition of negative theology. It probably found its greatest poet in Plotinus 
when he stated that the One was ungraspable (Enn. 6. 9. 4), indeed ineffable (Enn. 
5.3.13, 6. 9. 5), which is a contradiction of sorts since the words “God” or the 
“One” can be uttered (to name only these two) and understood, at least to a 
degree. Plotinus was aware that this idea went back to Plato himself who said that 




had ever sung a hymn about the supercelestial realm (Phaedrus 247 c). Pseudo-
Dionysius the Areopagite transmitted this tradition to the Middle Ages where it 
would influence giants like Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas,1 Nicholas of Cusa, 
Descartes and Pascal. This tradition has been renewed in our time by an author 
such as Jean-Luc Marion, 2  who has been profoundly influenced by Pseudo-
Dionysius and Heidegger’s departure from metaphysics and its understanding of 
God, indeed from the very idea that God would be understandable. As Jean 
Greisch recently argued in his illuminating study on the philosophical theologies 
of modernity, our epoch as a whole is fascinated by this idea that God is the 
“totally other,” to use an expression that was made popular, in the footsteps of 
Kierkegaard, by Rudolf Otto and the dialectical theology of Karl Barth.3 
This for many alluring view of God as the totally other is often traced 
back to a saying of Augustine that I use in my title—“si enim comprehendis, non 
est Deus”—a phrase that, unlike its subject perhaps, is easy to understand: “if you 
understand, it isn’t God.” This saying sounds like negative theology on steroids: 
it does not only state that God is way beyond our understanding, which is trivial 
if God is God, it claims or seems to claim that the very fact that we understand 
something about God means that it cannot be God. It is thus no surprise that 
Augustine’s saying is gleefully quoted by the proponents of the negative theology 
of our time.4 I fear that this appropriation of Augustine’s saying also partakes in 
the general attempt, on the part of some thinkers in these post-modern times, to 
humiliate human understanding as such (as if we had any other?), allegedly in the 
name of human finitude, the new absolute of many philosophers. 
I would like to focus here on the saying, si enim comprehendis, non est 
Deus, and see if it is true that we do not understand God at all. What strikes me in 
the appropriation of this saying by pure negative theology, is that it hides quite a 
few contradictions. Contradictions might also be fashionable when one is 
speaking of God, but I don’t believe they are commendable when one tries to 
																																																								
1 One can think of the response (respondeo) of article 7 of quaestio 12 in the first part of the 
Summa theologiae: comprehendere Deum impossibile est cuicumque intellecto creato (“to 
comprehend God is impossible to any created intellect”). It is quoted by K. Barth in § 27 of the 
second volume of his Kirchliche Dogmatik (II. Die Lehre von Gott I, Zollikon-Zurich: 
Evangelischer Verlag, 1940) on “The limits of the knowledge of God”, which also quotes 
Augustine’s si enim comprehendis, non est Deus. See K. Barth, Church Dogmatics, II.1. The 
Doctrine of God (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1957), p. 185. Needless to say, this “hiddenness” is 
limited for Barth to natural theology, since God reveals himself in Scripture. 
2 His book title of 1982, Dieu sans l’être (God without Being, The University of Chicago Press, 
1991, 2012) is also a twist on Augustinian’s idea that if we understand, it is not God. I am afraid the 
English translation of the title doesn’t convey this very well, since it fails to render the verbal and 
transitive meaning of “l’être” in the original title. A paraphrase of this title would be “God without 
being God”. In his later book on Augustine (Au lieu de soi. L’approche de saint Augustin, Paris: 
PUF, 2008, p. 392), Marion quotes Sermon 117, “si comprehenderis (sic), non est Deus”, and 
views the incomprehensibility of God as a condition of possibility of his thinkability: 
“l’impossibilité de comprendre ne constate pas seulement une impossibilité de fait, mais définit le 
champ et les conditions d’accès à Celui qui, faute d’incompréhensibilité, disparaît à la pensée”. 
3  See Jean Greisch, Du ‘non-autre’ au ‘tout-autre’. Dieu et l’absolu dans les théologies 
philosophiques de la modernité (Paris: PUF, 2013), p. VI f. 




unfold a coherent discourse on anything, God included. The contradiction in 
Augustine’s saying or, as I will argue, in the way it is used by some of his alleged 
followers seems obvious: one cannot say that “if one understands it isn’t God” 
unless one actually has “some” understanding of God that allows us to say that, 
by comparison, this or that understanding is not God. It is impossible to claim 
that God transcends all understanding if one doesn’t presuppose “some” minimal 
understanding of God, be it only as the being that transcends all understanding or 
that is infinitely better (melius) than anything that we can fathom, as Augustine 
himself puts it in his Confessions 7. 4. 6, 5  which is perhaps the source of 
Anselm’s famous argument. When we are speaking of God, even if we do not 
claim to know anything about her, we cannot but presuppose that those who 
listen to this word at least vaguely understand what it means (as Anselm will 
remind the insipiens in his Proslogion6). The notion that if we understand God it 
cannot be God thus appears contradictory, since it involves itself an 
understanding of God which hopes to be defensible. 
This self-contradiction is so plain, I cannot believe that Augustine 
himself could have endorsed it and that he can in this regard be used as an 
inspiration by the negative theologians of our time. To be sure, Augustine often 
speaks of God’s incomprehensibility, yet he constantly speaks about God, he 
wrote 15 volumes on the Trinity, very often he speaks to God, and cannot but 
presuppose that we “understand” about what, or whom, or to whom, he is then 
talking about. Furthermore, Augustine readily acknowledges that God revealed 
himself in both Scripture and his creation, and that he certainly did this in order 
to make himself understood. If God remains incomprehensible or ineffable in 
Augustine’s conception, it is because, when we speak of the divine, we always 
use a language that is suited to material things and can thus never adequately 
convey the spiritual reality of God. Yet, to say this, namely that God is a spiritual 
reality, is in effect to unfold an understanding of God! As such, Augustine cannot 
exclude that an understanding of God is possible. 
I believe that this can be shown through a more careful reading of his 
saying, Si enim comprehendis, non est Deus, and its context, which has not 
always been taken into account by those who gladly cite this quote from 
Augustine. The saying in question can be found in Augustine’s Sermon 117, 
which has been known for centuries, but of which François Dolbeau very 
recently, in 2014, published an impeccable critical edition.7  The date of the 
																																																								
5 Confessions 7.4.6: “Neque enim ulla anima umquam potuit poteritve cogitare aliquid, quod sit te 
melius, qui summum et optimum bonum es.” 
6 Anselm, Proslogion, chapter 2: “Sed certe ipse idem insipiens, cum audit hoc ipsum quod dico, 
aliquid quo nihil majus cogitari possit, intelligit quod audit, et quod intelligit, in intellectu ejus est, 
etiam si non intelligat illud esse.” 
7 See F. Dolbeau, “Le Sermon 117 d’Augustin sur l’ineffabilité de Dieu. Édition critique,” in Revue 
bénédictine 124 (2014), 213-253. It relies on the ancient collection De verbis Domini while taking 
into account the entire manuscript tradition and especially the newfound manuscripts in Mainz, on 
which Dolbeau published landmark studies. In the Patrologia latina (PL), it can be found in 
volume 38, p. 661-671. The sentence “si enim comprehendis, non est Deus” was quoted by John 




relatively lengthy sermon is usually given as 418.8 It is a sermon dedicated to the 
beginning of the Gospel of John, as its full title indicates: “Treatise (tractatus)9 of 
Saint Augustine against the Arians on [the words of the Gospel of John] ‘In the 
beginning was the Word (Verbum), and the Word was with God, and God was 
the Word, and the Verb was in the beginning with God’.” Needless to say, the 
beginning of the Gospel of John is a text Augustine often commented upon. It 
was also most significant for him since it played a decisive role in his conversion 
to Christianity as he describes it in Book 7 of the Confessions. 10  The title 
stipulates that the sermon in question is directed against the Arians.11 Its last part 
wishes to refute the Arian arguments against the coeternity of the Son and the 
Father and their perfect equality.12 I cannot offer here a full account of this 
sermon,13 and will concentrate on the context and philosophical significance of 
the saying, Si enim comprehendis, non est Deus, in order to argue that an 
understanding of God is indeed defensible for Augustine. 
 
The Pedagogical Intent of Augustine 
 
I will not make too much hay of the trivial fact that Augustine in this text is 
himself unfolding an understanding of a passage of Scripture and thus of God, 
since this is what a tractatus or sermo is all about. Neither will I insist on the 
equally trivial point that he is arguing against the Arian understanding of God, 
which he deems erroneous, in order to propose what he believes to be a better 
understanding. In both instances, i.e., in the very idea of an interpretation of 
Scripture and in arguing against a false understanding of divinity, Augustine 
presupposes that God can be understood. I will not make use, finally, of the fact 
that the very notion of God as verbum, as Augustine understands it, itself strongly 
suggests that God has revealed himself in the Word and that this Word (and thus 
God) can as such be understood, at least to a degree. All this is plain to see and 
																																																																																																																																										
Augustine on August 28, 1986: http://www.ewtn.com/library/papaldoc/jp2augus.htm. In this text, 
the reference to Augustine’s Sermo 117 (note 85) was erroneously to PL 38, 673 (recte: 663), as if 
to confirm that popes can be fallible. For a recent English translation of this sermon, which I will 
quote, with modifications, see E. Hill, The Works of Saint Augustine. A Translation for the 21st 
Century. Sermons, III/4 (New York: New City Press, 1992), p. 209-223 (2nd Release, Electronic 
edition, Past masters series, 2001). 
8 See E. Hill, The Works of Saint Augustine, III/4, p. 210. Dolbeau, “Le sermon 117”, p. 220, is 
more careful and situates it in the last 15 years of Augustine’s life (415-430). 
9 Following here the text of Dolbeau, p. 227 (based on the Mainz manuscript; the other versions 
referenced by Dolbeau speak of sermo). Tractatus does not of course mean a treatise in our sense of 
the word, but a “treatment”, a discussion and in the case of Augustine, a homily or sermo. 
10 Dolbeau, p. 214. 
11 Dolbeau, p. 227. 
12 Dolbeau, p. 215. 
13 On this see P. van Geest, “De Deo loquimur, quid mirum si non comprehendis? (s. 117). The 
Merging of Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy and Negativity in Augustine’s Preaching,” in G. Partoens / A. 
Dupont / M. Lamberigts (ed.), Ministerium sermonis. Philological, Historical, and Theological 
Studies on Augustine’s Sermones ad populum (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), p. 199-220, which can 
also be found in P. van Geest, The Incomprehensibility of God: Augustine as a Negative Theologian 




only needs reminding against those who would allege, with or without Augustine, 
that no understanding of God is possible. 
I would rather like to insist, first, on the pedagogical intent of the saying 
“If you understand, it isn’t God”, an intent which is very much in evidence 
throughout Sermon 117. From the outset, Augustine makes a point of professing 
that he will not try to explain how the text of Scripture (In principio erat Verbum, 
et Verbum erat apud Deum, et Deus erat Verbum) should be understood 
(intellegi).14 Instead, he says, he will explain why this text is not understood 
(quare non intellegatur) and, more specifically, what prevents it from being 
understood (sed dicimus quid impediat ne intellegatur). In other words, the 
incomprehensibility of this passage of Scripture is not absolute. It has a reason. It 
has to do with the fact that the eye of our heart is not pure, a condition of 
understanding on which the very first line of the Sermo insists: “the passage of 
the Gospel we have just heard, brothers, requests a clear and pure eye of the heart 
(clarum et purum oculum cordis inquirit).”15 Unless this eye is pure, we will not 
understand Scripture. The “incomprehensibility” of Scripture and hence of God is 
not fundamental. 
Not only that: the incomprehensibility we experience in reading this 
passage is there to make us suffer (doloret) because we don’t understand, so that 
it can serve as an incentive for us to remove what prevents us from understanding, 
that is, the impurity of our heart: 
 
What I am saying is how incomprehensible is the passage that was read 
to us. But in any case, it wasn’t read in order to be understood by human 
beings (non ut comprehendetur ab homine), but in order to make us 
grieve because we don’t understand it (sed quia doloret homo quia non 
comprehendit), and make us try to discover what prevents our 
understanding, and so move it out of the way, and hunger to grasp the 
unchangeable Word (et inveniret unde impeditur a comprehensione, et 
removeret ea, et inhiaret perceptioni incommutabilis Verbi), ourselves 
thereby being changed from worse to better.16 
 
The incomprehensibility of Scripture and what it says about the Verbum 
is thus qualified: it is incomprehensible because our heart isn’t pure. Moreover, 
																																																								
14 Sermo 117.3 (Dolbeau, p. 229); Hill translation, The Works of Saint Augustine, III/4, p. 210. It is 
worth noting that Augustine uses here the verb intellegere, not comprehendere, which he will use in 
his saying. I will point later to the difference between the two terms. Augustine explains in this 
context (ibid.) that God can only be understood in ways beyond words (ineffabiliter potest intellegi), 
since human words cannot suffice for the understanding of the Word of God (non verbis hominis fit 
ut intellegatur Verbum Dei). The limit of human words, as we stressed and as Sermon 117 will 
confirm, is that their material nature impedes a proper understanding of the spiritual. Nonetheless, a 
non-verbal “experience” of God is possible and we will see that Sermon 117 will also try to 
describe it. 
15 Sermo 117.1 (Dolbeau, p. 227); Hill translation (modified), The Works of Saint Augustine, III/4, p. 
209. 




this incomprehensibility is intended, as it were: its purpose is to make us suffer 
(doloret) from this incomprehensibility, thus spurring us to remove what prevents 
understanding. Understanding thus appears here highly desirable. More than that, 
Augustine suggests that it is also reachable, at least to a certain extent, in that we 
can somehow aspire (inhiaret) toward the perception of the unchangeable Word 
(inhiaret perceptioni incommutabilis Verbi). “Perception” is here a lazy, literal 
translation of perceptio, which alludes to a genuine “participation” in the 
unchangeable Word, which does not exclude some form of understanding, as I 
will argue. Such an understanding is obviously not our sole accomplishment. God 
must help us bring it about by leading us to change our ways (as God obviously 
did with Augustine in the Confessions): Faciat Deus ut intellegatis, writes 
Augustine in Sermo 117, “May God enable you to understand!”17 With the help 
of God, understanding (again intellegere here) is certainly possible. 
One of the many things we don’t understand about God and his Word is 
how God “is not less in his parts than in his totality.”18 We do not understand this 
because our judgments are based on bodily objects we can see in space. It is 
undeniable that the parts of these objects occupy less space than the whole: an 
arm or head is less than the body it is part of. Bodily images and language are 
unsuited for the Word of God, and we should avoid imagining spiritual entities 
by following the lead of material realities (non de suggestione carnis spiritalia 




It is immediately after claiming this (Sermo 117.4), that Augustine makes his 
‘famous’ statement (Sermo 117.5): 
 
But you are quite unable to imagine or think of such a thing [i.e., a Being 
that is no less in his parts than in his totality]. And such ignorance is 
more pious than any presumption of knowledge. After all, we are talking 
of God. It says: Et Deus erat Verbum. We are talking about God; so why 
be surprised if you cannot comprehend? (De Deo loquimur, quid mirum 
si non comprehendis) Indeed, if you comprehend, it isn’t God (si enim 
comprehendis, non est Deus). Let us rather make a devout confession of 
ignorance (confessio ignorantiae), instead of a brash profession of 
knowledge. It is certainly a great beatitude to somehow touch God with 
the mind (adtingere aliquantum mente Deum magna beatitudo est), but to 
																																																								
17 Sermo 117.3 (Dolbeau, p. 230); Hill translation, The Works of Saint Augustine, III/4, p. 211. 
18 Sermo 117.4 (Dolbeau, p. 231: non est ille Deus minor in parte quam in toto); Hill translation, 
The Works of Saint Augustine, III/4, p. 211. The importance of this point in the polemics against the 
Arians cannot be understated, since they argued that the Word, as the engendered Son of God, was 
necessarily less than God the Father or at least secondary in relation to the Father. 





comprehend him, is totally impossible (comprehendere autem, omnino 
impossibile).21 
 
As I have insisted, the incomprehensibility of God is here qualified to the 
extent that it also has to do with the impurity of our hearts. As much as possible, 
we should strive to remove this obstacle, all the more so because this 
incomprehension makes us suffer (doloret). God can only assist us in this regard 
(faciat Deus ut intellegatis). As we underlined, this seems to suggest that some 
understanding is possible and even desirable. 
However, in the present state of impurity (which can be lifted; Augustine 
seems a case in point, at least in the way he describes his moral conversion in the 
Confessions), whatever we can comprehend cannot be God. We cannot 
understand, more specifically, how God can be no less in his parts (say, in his 
Word) than his totality. In this condition, a confession (!) of one’s ignorance is 
thus more devout than any foolhardy profession of science (magis pia est talis 
ignorantia, an anticipation of Cusanus’ docta ignorantia), Augustine holds.22 
God is however not unattainable for Augustine, as the very passage we 
are trying to understand makes clear. Right after emphasizing that a confession of 
our ignorance is more pious than any presumptuous claim to knowledge, 
Augustine states, surprisingly perhaps since nothing in what he had said before 
prepares the hearer for this, that God can to some extent (aliquantum) be 
“touched” (attingere) by the mind, an experience which can only bring about a 
great beatitude (magna beatitudo). Augustine uses here a strong verb, adtingere, 
which evokes the idea of touching (Hill translates it by the paraphrase “a little 
touch or taste of God”) by the mind. 
This might sound strange, at least to our ears: God could not be 
understood (comprehendere autem, omnino impossibile), but he could be touched 
(adtingere aliquantum mente Deum)! Quick readers could point out here an 
inconsistency: how can we somehow touch God, yet not understand him? 
Doesn’t the touching of God imply some understanding?23 For how do we know 
it is God we are touching if we don’t “understand” it is God? The Latin word 
Augustine uses to describe this touching by the mind is intriguing: adtingere, to 
attain. It literally means to “touch at” (“ad-tingere”), evoking something like an 
“approaching,” a “reaching for,” a “bordering on” that barely strokes or brushes 
																																																								
21 Sermo 117.5 (Dolbeau, p. 231-232); Hill translation (modified), The Works of Saint Augustine, 
III/4, p. 211-212. 
22 Sermo 117.5 (Dolbeau, p. 231); Hill translation, The Works of Saint Augustine, III/4, p. 211. One 
can recall that in the first lines of the Confessions (1.1.1.) Augustine takes up the Bible verse that 
God “opposes the proud” (Prov 3:34, 1 Peter 5:5). 
23 Augustine speaks of a touching with the mind (mente). Somehow I cannot but think of Leonard 
Cohen’s chorus in his song “Suzanne,” all the more so in the immediate aftermath of his passing on 
November 7, 2016: “For you’ve touched her perfect body with your mind,” a song which is 
otherwise replete with religious references (“Jesus was a sailor . . . he knew for certain only 
drowning men could see him . . . he himself was broken, long before the sky would open. . . . Our 




what it is attaining. It is further qualified by the adverb aliquantum,24 which is an 
adverb of quantity (alis, quantum). This quantity can be one of intensity (“to a 
certain degree”) or of duration (“for a while”). In the Hill translation, it is 
translated as an adverb of intensity (“a little touch or taste of God” 25 ), but 
aliquantum often has a temporal meaning in Augustine. 26  It can be vaguely 
rendered by “to a certain extent”, which leaves the scale of this touching open. 
But Augustine does not say here (he will in other passages, to which we shall 
return) that it is modest. Indeed, aliquantum, as it is usually used in Latin, often 
connotes a high or a notable quantity.27 
The strong word in this context remains adtingere, to attain or to touch, 
be it only to a certain extent or for a while. In the same paragraph of Sermo 117.5, 
Augustine states that this touching of God (literally: “touching God”, adtingere 
Deum) is accomplished by the eyes of the heart (oculis cordis),28 to which the 
very first line of the sermon had already alluded: Capitulum evangelii quod 
lectum est, fratres, clarum et purum oculum cordis inquirit (Sermo 117.1.). 
Augustine stresses again in our paragraph (117.5.) that this touching only occurs 
if this eye is pure (sufficit ut attingat, si purus est oculus).29 
The idea that the “touching” of God requires moral and ascetic purity 
was common in Neoplatonism, 30  but Augustine also found it in passages of 
Scripture, such as Mt 5:8: “Blessed are the clean of heart because they will see 
God”. Augustine commented extensively on this verse and took it literally.31 Our 
Sermo 117 has a few things to say about this touching of God. When the eye of 
the heart touches God, it does so through an unbodily and spiritual tact (si autem 
																																																								
24 Note that it could also be an adjective aliquantus, -a, -um. 
25 A 19th Century translation of Sermon 117 (St. Augustine, Sermons on Selected Lessons of the 
New Testament, translated by R. G. Macmullen, Oxford: J.H. Parker, 1844, p. 789), which can be 
easily found online, is even more vague and in my view insufficient: “To reach to God in any 
measure by the mind, is a great blessedness.” 
26  Compare the usage of aliquantum in Confessions 9.10.26: Unum erat quod in hac vita 
aliquantum immorari cupiebam, ut te christianum catholicum viderem, priusquam morerer (“there 
was only one reason why I wanted to remain for a while in this life, namely to see you a Catholic 
Christian, before I die,” quoted following Dorothea Weber, “For what is what so monstrous as what 
the Punic says?”, in Augustine afer. Saint Augustin: africanité et universalité, ed. by P.-Y. Fux, J.-
M. Roessli, O. Wermelinger and M. von Graffenried, Fribourg, Suisse: Éditions universitaires, 
2003, p. 77). 
27 I am following here my Gaffiot Latin-French dictionary on aliquantum that gives as the primary 
meaning: “une assez grande quantité, une quantité notable.” 
28 An expression that according to Dolbeau (p. 217) goes back to Origen. Compare Plato, Rep. 533 
c. 
29 Sermo 117.5 (Dolbeau, p. 233); Hill translation, The Works of Saint Augustine, III/4, p. 212. 
30 On this see W. J. Hankey, “Reason,” in Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1999), p. 698.  
31 See for instance his Letter 147: Augustine to Paulina, The Works of Saint Augustine, II/2, p. 321 
et passim, to which we will return. This idea might perhaps be hard to square with the Christian 
notion that God is more accessible to sinners (Luke 19:10; compare Leonard Cohen, from the same 





attingit, tactu quodam attingit incorporeo et spiritali),32 that is not, Augustine 
stresses yet again, a comprehension (non tamen comprendit). He also underscores 
that it is this tactus or this touching that makes us happy (beatus), all the more so 
since we then touch “that which always remains happy” (illud quod semper 
beatum manet), indeed that which is “itself perpetual beatitude” (et est illud ipsa 
beatitudo perpetua). It is through this touching that man becomes vivus 
(animated, lively), by contact with perpetual life, and it is through it that man is 
made wise (unde fit homo sapiens [a nice, if of course unwanted allusion to the 
name of our species!]), by perfect wisdom itself, and through it that he is 
illuminated by eternal light (ibid.). “It is by this touching that man becomes what 
he wasn’t before, whereas what he touches (God) does not become something 
else,” since it always remains the same. Augustine can thus conclude: Deus non 
crescit ex cognitore, sed cognitor ex cognitione Dei, “God does not grow out of 
the one who knows him, it is the knower who grows out of the cognition of 
God.”33 
Astute interpreters of Augustine such as James O’Donnell and Vincent 
Giraud are right to link this slight yet exalting touching of God, which Augustine 
in Sermon 117 calls a cognitio though not a comprehendere, with the brisk 
contemplative “touching” that is described in Book 9 of his Confessions. 34 
Augustine gives here an account of an “ecstatic” experience he shared with his 
mother at Ostia, shortly before her death and after his conversion, which went 
hand in hand with a moral purification (which is the crux of Book 8 of the 
Confessions). While talking about what the eternal life of the saints was all about 
(9.10.23), we came to realize, Augustine recalls, that the pleasures of the senses 
were nothing compared to the joy of this other life (9.10.24). We then suddenly, 
he goes on, “ascended inside ourselves” (adhuc ascendebamus interius), fixing 
our gaze, our discourse and our admiration on your works (cogitando et loquendo 
et mirando opera tua). It is then that “we went into our minds (venimus in mentes 
nostras), yet we also transcended them (et transcendimus eas) to touch the region 
of unlacking abundance (ut attingeremus regionem ubertatis indeficientis) where 
you feed Israel for eternity in the pasture of truth” (Ez 34:14). It is there “that life 
is wisdom (ubi vita sapientia est) through which all things present were made and 
those that will become will be made. Wisdom itself, however, is not made, but it 
is as it was and will always remain.” Now, while we were talking and “aspiring 
toward it” (inhiamus35 illi), “we touched it slightly in a total push of the heart” 
(attingimus eam modice toto ictu cordis). 
																																																								
32 Sermo 117.5 (Dolbeau, p. 233); Hill translation, The Works of Saint Augustine, III/4, p. 212. 
33 Ibid. 
34  See V. Giraud, Augustin, les signes et la manifestation (Paris: PUF, 2013), p. 246; J. J. 
O’Donnell, Augustine: Confessions III. Commentary on Books 8-13 (Oxford University Press, 1992, 
2012), p. 130, on the similarities between the recurrent attingere in Conf. 9.10.24-25 and Sermon 
117. 
35  It is the same verb Augustine uses in Sermo 117.3 (Dolbeau, p. 230; The Works of Saint 
Augustine, III/4, p. 210: inhiaret perceptioni incommutabilis Verbi / to strive toward the perception 




The parallels between the vision of Ostia, which is often called a mystic 
experience,36 and Sermon 117 are striking. Both speak of an attingere (the word 
is used no less than three times in Confessions 9.10.24-25), of a touching or an 
attaining of the higher reality. In both contexts, this touching is achieved by a 
movement of the heart (a moderate one in the Confessions: modice) and what is 
touched is Wisdom itself, which remains eternally the same. Both contexts also 
stress that this touching is the source of the highest beatitude or joy in the case of 
the Confessions (nonne hoc est: intra in gaudium domini tui, Confessions 
9.10.25). 37  The only difference (if it is one) with Sermon 117 is that the 
Confessions call this outstanding experience (which for all intents and purposes 
marks a climax in the narrative of the Confessions in Books 1-9 since the rest of 
Book 9 will recount the illness and death of Monica), a moment of intelligence 
(hoc momentum intelligentiae). He seems to deny this in Sermon 117 when he 
claims that this touching has nothing whatsoever to do with any understanding 
(Sermo 117. 3.5: comprehendere autem, omnino impossibile). We might find this 
difficult to understand, since it is hard to believe that one can actually “touch” 
God, as the highest wisdom and the source of all happiness, without 
“understanding” that it is God that we are actually touching. 
 
Seeing and Understanding 
 
Augustine obviously has another understanding of comprehendere than we do. 
As is clear from Sermon 117, it entailed more for him than a brisk touching of 
divinity, which can happen in a rare moment of ecstasy. Comprehendere evokes 
an intellectual grasp that is much more than a mere seeing, or even a cognitio or 
intelligentia. 38 Augustine felicitously explains what he understands by 
comprehendere in his Letter 147 to Paulina (written in 413 or 414, so that it is not 
																																																								
36 On the issue of whether Augustine can be viewed as a mystic, see the recent, well-documented 
thesis of Mireille Cassin, Augustin est-il mystique?, Thèse de doctorat présentée à la Faculté de 
théologie de l’Université de Fribourg (Suisse), 2014. 
37 In his related Letter 147 to Paulina (chap. 13.31; PL, 33, 610; The Works of Augustine, II/2, p. 
335), Augustine discusses the issue of how the substance of God could be experienced (through 
some seeing or hearing) by certain people still situated in this life. He is thinking of Moses who was 
taken in an ineffable experience when God said to him: No one can see my face and live (Ex 33:20). 
Augustine wonders how Moses’ mind could have made this experience, “whether, while its union 
with the body remained, the mind was removed from this life to that life, as often [!] occurs in very 
intense ecstasy, or whether the mind was totally released from the body, as happens in complete 
death” (ut sive in corpore, sive extra corpus fuerit, id est utrum, sicut solet in vehementiori extasi, 
mens ab hac vita in illam vitam fuerit alienata manente corporia vinculo, an omino resolutio facta 
fuerit, qualis in plena morte contingit, nescire se disceret). This “vehement ecstasy,” which can 
happen while the union with the body remains, seems to correspond to the touching alluded to in 
Sermo 117 and in the ecstatic experience of Ostia. 
38 Augustine uses the term cognitio in Sermo 117.5 (Dolbeau, p. 233; Hill translation, The Works of 
Saint Augustine, III/4, p. 212) to describe the adtingere Deum that is not a comprehendere, and the 
Confessions 9.10.25 speak, as we just saw, of the experience of ecstasy as a momentum 




far removed from Sermon 117), which is an almost book-length treatise dedicated 
to the vision of God: 
 
For it is one thing to see (videre); it is another to comprehend 
(comprehendere) the whole while seeing. For that which is somehow 
perceived when it is present is, of course, seen, but the whole is 
comprehended by seeing when it is seen in such a way that nothing of it 
escapes the attention of the seer or when its boundaries can be seen. For 
example, nothing in your present will escape your attention, and you can 
see the boundaries of your ring. As examples I gave you these two, one 
of which pertains to the sight of the mind, the other to bodily eyes. 
Vision, as Ambrose said, can refer to both of them, that is, to the eyes 
and to the mind.39 
 
Under these premises, one can understand how it is that one can see or 
touch God, according to Sermon 117, yet not comprehend him. A comprehendere 
of God would amount to a seeing (as for the Greeks, reason is generally 
understood as a form of vision for Augustine40) in such a way that nothing of 
God would escape the attention of the seer or when its boundaries could be seen. 
It is obvious enough that no one can say this about God. This notion of 
understanding (as comprehendere), at least as it is presented in Letter 147 in a 
passage that will be quoted by Thomas in his Summa,41 connotes in Augustine’s 
Latin a perfect mastery and a conceptual grasp of something, not unlike like the 
one that was attempted by the proud philosophers. For Augustine, and not only 
for him, I am sure, we cannot fully grasp the reality of God with our concepts, we 
can only slightly touch or attain (attingere) it, a touching he can however also 
call a cognitio and a moment of intelligence (from intellegere, which is less 
totalizing in Augustine’s Latin than comprehendere). 
 
The Touching of God in our Understanding Today 
 
By evoking the notion of a touching of God, Augustine stands in the 
(Neo)Platonic tradition for which the task of philosophy or religion (there is no 
																																																								
39 Letter 147. 9; PL 33, 606; Augustine to Paulina in The Works of Saint Augustine, II/, p. 330 
(modified): Aliud est enim videre, aliud est totum videndo comprehendere. Quandoquidem id 
videtur, quod praesens utcumque sentitur: totum autem comprehenditur videndo, quod ita videtur 
ut nihil ejus lateat videntem, aut cujus fines circumspici possunt. 
40 W. J. Hankey, “Reason,” in A. D. Fitzgerald, Augustine through the Ages. An Encyclopedia 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing, 1999), p. 699. 
41 Summa theologiae, I, qu. 12, art. 7. It is interesting to note that Descartes, at least in his Letter to 
Mersenne of May 27, 1630 (AT I, 17-18, quoted in J. Greisch, p. 125), espouses a similar notion of 
comprehension: “comprendre, c’est embrasser de la pensée.” Not surprisingly, Jean-Luc Marion 
diagnoses a “conceptual idolatry” in this “embrasser de la pensée” (see J. Greisch, ibid.). However 
that may be, it is fascinating to observe that, according to Descartes, if we cannot comprehend God, 
we can certainly touch him with thinking (“toucher de la pensée”, AT I, 152; quoted in J. Greisch, p. 




real difference between the two for him, since he sees the Christian Gospel as the 
true philosophy, as the first lines of his De vera religione make very clear) is to 
unite us with the higher reality.42 
 If I am not mistaken (and it is easy to be in the case of God), this notion 
that we would somehow be able to “touch” God and be united with him is viewed 
as more problematic today, at least for the average believer during her lifetime. 
This Platonic idea of a direct experience of God, which is of course the root of 
the visio beatifica (and even of happiness understood as bliss, on which popular 
culture continues to thrive), is perhaps deemed to be not very common in this age 
of scientific rationality, where experience is allegedly limited to verifiable spatio-
temporal entities. It has not however disappeared entirely. Some do claim to have 
made a “supernatural” experience of God. I cannot claim to be one of them 
whom I can only envy. I am also, I confess, a tad suspicious about those claims: 
how can we be sure that this experience or touching of God is not a matter of 
self-suggestion, despite the genuine honesty of those who claim to have 
experienced it? Nonetheless, this notion of a direct experience of God does 
survive in quite a few of the most influential philosophies of religion today. I am 
thinking especially, in the English-speaking world, of Robert Bellah, who often 
equates “religion” with what he calls a “unitive experience,”43 or Charles Taylor 
who understands the religious experience as a response to a direct call from 
God.44 It is in this sense that religion is for him a “transformative” experience. 
However that may be, what separates us from Augustine is also our 
perhaps more modest understanding of comprehendere. When Augustine seems 
to deny that we can understand God (si enim comprehendis, non est Deus), he 
does not mean to say that God totally escapes our knowledge (say, cognitio), our 
intelligence (intelligentia, intellegere) or even our grasp (indeed, we can have a 
tactus of God according to Sermo 117). He means that we do not have a full 
mastery of God, a comprehendere, which would allow us to understand the 
whole reality (totum) of God. That is certainly the case. But it would be mistaken, 
I believe, to enlist Augustine among the negative theologians of our time who 
proudly trumpet that we have no understanding of God whatsoever and that if we 
do, it cannot be God (to say nothing here about the post-modern “refuseniks” of 
																																																								
42 See W. J. Hankey, “Reason,” in Augustine through the Ages, p. 698. 
43  R. Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2011), p. 12: “The unitive event then, is a kind of ground zero with respect to 
religious representations.” 
44 See the strong statement in A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2007), p. 768: “In our religious lives we are responding to a transcendent reality. 
We all [!] have a sense of this, which emerges in our identifying and recognizing some mode of 
what I have called fullness, and seeking to attain it. Modes of fullness recognized by exclusive 
humanisms, and others that remain within the immanent frame, are therefore responding to 
transcendent reality, but misrecognizing it.” Taylor argues here that even atheists have the 





understanding who claim we don’t understand anything at all!45). Of course, we 
have such an understanding: we understand something of what the word God 
means (even when we deny his existence) and we can understand something 
about God through his Scripture and his works. It is not because we cannot grasp, 
through a comprehendere, the complete reality of God that we have no 
understanding of God at all. Maybe it’s time to take some distance from the 
obsessive attempt of some to debase humankind’s capability of intelligence and 
to realize that the capacity to understand reality through God and to understand 
the Beauty of God are some of our greatest possibilities. 
 
																																																								
45 If this is true, they would not understand what they are saying when they are saying this (on this 
they might have a point). 
